By Federico Meneghini Sassoli
In questa breve ricerca propongo al lettore una sintetica “rivalutazione” della performance economica dell’impero Austro-Ungarico, giudicata frequentemente non soltanto come decisamente inadeguata ma anche come una delle cause dietro al suo rapido scioglimento nei mesi terminali della Grande Guerra. Ho cercato di seguire un percorso cronologico nella mia analisi seguendo brevemente ciascuno dei suoi “periodi economici” degli ultimi suoi secoli di esistenza. Nel corso della dissertazione cito frequentemente l’ipotesi presentata da David Good in quanto, pur tenendo ben conto dei suoi limiti dovuti ai dati utilizzati, l’ho trovata sufficientemente convincente. In particolare mi sono sentito in dovere di riprendere il suggestivo parallelo tracciato fra le differenze economiche interne all’Impero e interne agli Stati Uniti d’America negli anni seguenti la Guerra Civile.
Dans cette brève recherche j’ai envie de proposer au lecteur une synthétique “ré-évaluation” de la performance économique de l’Empire austro-hongris, laquelle a été souvent jugée comme insatisfaisante et aussi une des causes qui a emmené l’Empire a sa rapide dissolution dans les mois terminantes la Grande Guerre. Dans mon analyse j’ai essayé de suivre un chemin chronologique en suivant brièvement chacune de ses « périodes économiques » des derniers siècles d’existence. Au cours de la thèse, je cite fréquemment l’hypothèse présentée par David Good car, tout en tenant compte de ses limites dues aux données utilisées, je l’ai trouvée suffisamment convaincante. En particulier, je me suis senti obligé de reprendre le parallèle frappant établi entre les différences économiques au sein de l’Empire et au sein des États-Unis d’Amérique dans les années qui ont suivi la guerre de Sécession.
In this brief research I tried to propose to the reader a synthetic re-evaluation of the economic performance of the Austro-Hungarian empire, frequently judged as not excellent and one of the many causes of its rapid dissolution at the end of the Great War. I have tried to follow a chronological path in my analysis, step by step, of the “economical periods” of the last two centuries of imperial existence. During my essay I have frequently mentioned the hypothesis suggested by David Good as I found them quite convincing even giving its statistical limits. In particular I found suggestive the comparison between the economic internal divide present in the two halves of the empire and of the United States of America following the American Civil war.
Modern Economic Growth in the Austro-Hungarian Empire
The introduction of a new economic system, which began at the end of the eighteenth century with the “First industrial revolution”, is a key moment in European history. This type of modern economic growth is defined by P. Vries as “ in contrast to growth in all preceding organic, ‘Malthusian’ economies, based on a massive and new use of energy sources and raw materials, on new technologies and new institutions”. This revolutionary event would gradually spread throughout all of Europe.
Until recently, academics have judged the economic performance of the Habsburg Empire quite harshly. Gross notes that: the empire allegedly lacked the entrepreneurial talent and capital necessary for modern economic growth ; geographical barriers obstructed the formation of an efficient communications network; the prohibitive tariff policy insulated industry from the dynamic technological development of western Europe; the institution of serfdom hindered the development of agriculture; and, in general, the persistence of feudal values and institutions acted as a brake on modernization.
Good holds a different position on the subject, highlighting for example how the westernmost part of the empire already presented characteristics of this growth in the early nineteenth century. An important vehicle of this new economic system was immigration of human capital. This took the form of a bourgeois migration that can be broken in three waves : first from Italy, France ad the Habsburg Netherland in the seventeenth century, then a considerable influx of metalworkers from England in the mid eighteenth century, and lastly in the nineteenth century when we see English mechanics, working in cotton textiles sector and machine building industries, as well as Swiss and German financiers, in the role of bankers and factory owners.
Those waves of qualified and specialised human capital brought a steady increase in domestic industries, founded on the putting-out system. In 1790 still 75% of the population of the empire were active in the, mainly agrarian, primary sector, but at the same time also mining activities held a certain relevance. Meanwhile within the empire there were 280 manufacturing firms active, half of which in Lower Austria, with around a third in Bohemian lands.
The State, initially under Maria Theresa and subsequently under Joseph II and Leopold II, actively promoted centralization, eroding the guild privileges and creating new privileges, the “State granted manufacturing”. Also, the presence of serfdom, often criticised as one of the most backward characteristics of the empire, was relatively advanced compared to the German states and France. Since thirty years of revolutionary wars had left the empire in a state of economic stagnation, those first signals of a modern economic growth were staggered and isolated. Also the continental blockade active during the Napoleonic period created a 20-years technological lag, a missed opportunity of skills and tech influx.
Good, challenging the hypothesis of Marxist historians as Brusatti and Rosdolsky, insists that many signs of a modern growth were already present from the first decades of the nineteenth century, one of the most important being the continued growth in Austrian population, possible only in a society with constant productivity growth, from 1817 to 1845 we see a 1% annual growth. Also pertinent is the data on industrial growth, between 3.3% and 2.5% (Rudolph’s and Komlos’s estimates respectively) from 1829 to 1845, as well as the data on coal consumption, 8.6% growth per annum from 1831 to 1850 (this data compares favourably with the one of France and Germany). Richard
Rudolph states: “If we refer to the beginning of mechanisation and when the Austrian industrial development became comparable to the rest of [Western industrialised] Europe, we can say that Austria industrialised in the 1830s and 1840s”.
European and Imperial Regional Differences
Thought Europe has been defined as a single overarching technological system, it nevertheless presented sharp regional differences. The geographical path is essentially determining the nature of the empire’s economic development.
The development of the Habsburg Empire could be viewed as a microcosm of European development more generally, with its western part already presenting many elements of modern economic growth from the eighteenth century, increasing the economic gap with its eastern, more agriculturally oriented part in the first half of the nineteenth century.
In the following text I will be using Good’s subdivisions of the empire, with its seven distinct regional units. In order to better reflect the empire’s territories and main administrative division in the Dual Monarchy, he divided the empire in two main components: Austria and Hungary, which in turn were divided into four and three regions respectively. In theorising this division Good mostly tried to account for unitary ethnic composition and a long-standing historical continuity in terms of economic and political coherence.
- Alpine lands, comprising Upper and Lower Austria, Vienna, Styria, Salzburg, Carinthia,
Tyrol, Vorarlberg. Those lands were the nucleus of the Habsburg territories. Ethnically it was a mostly German region but with a strong Italian minority in the historical region of Tyrol and a Slovenian minority in Styria and Carinthia.
- Bohemian lands, as a region linked with western Europe, comprising Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia (predominantly Czechs regions, with a sizeable German minority, more confused in Silesia, where there was no leading group, in order by magnitude were Germans, Poles and Czechs).
- Carpathian lands, comprising Galicia and Bukovina (predominantly Poles, but with significant German minorities in Bukovina where ruthenian and rumanian were dominant groups).
- Southern lands comprising Trieste, Carniola, Istria, Dalmatia and Gorizia. This region has no historical continuity nor ethnical predominant group. Those territories are bound by their orientation toward the Adriatic Sea and its non-German composition. Carniola was mainly Slovenian; Dalmatia mainly Croats and Serbs; while the rest of the territories were mainly populated by Italians ( though without an absolute majority) followed by Slovenes and then Serbo-Croats.
- Inner Hungary, economically the most important region of Hungary, and occupying the same territory as the historic Kingdom of Hungary, (it was not divided into regions unlike Austria) comprising the following unofficial subregions: Danube Right Bank (mainly Magyar with a significant German minority), Danube Left Bank (Two thirds Slovaks with a significant Magyar minority), Danube-Tisza Basin (hearth and soul of the kingdom, Budapest, Magyar, sizeable German minority), Tisza Right Bank (Magyar majority with a significant Slovak minority and a Ukrainian presence) and lastly, Tisza-Maros Basin (no ethnic majority, Romanian and Magyar were the largest groups).
- Transylvania, as big as one of the inner Hungary subregions, important for its unique history, and its key role against the Turks under the Habsburg. Until 1867 it enjoyed some administrative autonomy (from 1765 to 1848 it was a separate “Principality”). It’s composition is, as many other parts of Half of the population was Romanian with significant Magyar(30%) and German (10%) minorities.
- Croatia-Slavonia its roots are in the historic Kingdom of Croatia, central in Habsburg defence policy. From the sixteenth century to the nineteenth a long strip of land formed the Military Border district of the empire. This region had a substantial Croat majority with a sizeable Serb minority.
In the westernmost region of the empire, the Austrian regions, a structural shift from agriculture had already begun in the eighteenth century. The most dynamic region in this process is Bohemia, whose textile industries had been significant since the late sixteenth century, particularly around Reichenberg (now Liberec) and also Prague and Brünn. These lands received an important influx of capitals from English merchants, like Robert Allason. A sizeable glass industry was also present, of lesser importance but growing steadily, until it became a central export in the late eighteenth century. During the same century the chemical sector experienced growth thanks to increased demand for glass and woollen textile.
The other main centre of industrial activity during the eighteenth century was the Alpine Lands region, playing a pivotal role in mining and metallurgy sectors in Styria, upper Austria, Carinthia and less Carniola. These provinces produced 75% of Austrian pig iron in 1780.
At the time Austria was a leading nation in pig iron production, with Styria alone producing as much as England in 1767. The largest plant was the Innerberger Hauptgewerkshaff, founded in 1625, accounting for 2-3000 employees at the time, making it one of the greatest ironworks in the world in both the seventeenth and eighteenth century.
The second most prominent industry in these regions was the textile one, with its core located near Vienna and in Vorarlberg. Other relevant industries were glass and papermaking, concentrated in Bohemia. The remaining parts of the empire were more agriculturally oriented.
Industrialization Effort in the Vormärz period
In the Vormärz period (1815-1848) the Empire underwent important transformations, particularly in the western part. The most dynamic industry in this period proved to be the textile industry. It was a vehicle of innovation, especially steam engines and factory systems. The Linz Woolens enterprise was the first factory in Austria; this dynamism is a recurring characteristic of the textile industry more broadly: England, with its improvements in the production system during the first Industrial Revolution, Austria with its innovative approaches, and France’s rapid adoption of modern techniques . Austria’s textile industry saw significant involvement of English machinery, such as John Thornton’s firm in Pottendorf. This industry was chiefly present in two provinces: Lower Austria and Bohemia; in 1841 Lower Austria had 41.3% of the total number of spindles and 48% of the total production of the empire, meanwhile Bohemia had 39.6% of the spindles and 30.9% of production .
Another of the empire’s leading industries was the iron industry; its leading role in Europe was lost due to innovations in iron smelting and mining during the first industrial revolution. The empire’s iron industry underwent a process of rapid growth at this time (with a mean of 4-5% per annum), but it was not a period of technological innovation. The substitution of charcoal with coal, steam engine hot blast furnaces, and the puddling and rolling of pig iron came slowly to the Austrian iron industry. Still, there were substantial innovations before 1848, such as by the presence of enlarged furnaces and the introduction of the hot blast technique on a wider scale from 1837 to 1843 which reduced charcoal requirements. According to Paulinyi’s data: from 1800 to 1850 the number of workers in the sector increased by 50% while the output increased by 300%.
In 1830s we see puddling on a small scale but also experimentation with peat and brown coal, particularly in August Rosthorn’s ironworks. A rapid diffusion of new techniques occurred in the 1850s in particular, mainly in Bohemian Lands, where we see an even quicker diffusion of English techniques such as puddling, brought in by English engineers employed for this very reason in the 30s in Moravia.
Another dynamic industry was that of sugar; promoted by the Polytechnical Institute of Vienna, the production of beet sugar was developed during the years of the Continental Blockade, then expanded in the 30s with the diffusion of Franco-German technologies for refining sugar.
Still there was a substantial perceived backwardness of the empire vis-à-vis the rest of Europe, this had important political results as it pushed Austrian industrialists to oppose the Austrian entrance into the Zollverein. This was also motivated by the fact that the quality of imperial products varied greatly, tending to be either high end or poor quality. In some areas Austrian products were superior to German ones, for example Bohemian glass, Styrian steel, Viennese footwear, Italian silks, and gloves. In other sectors the quality was much lower but so were prices, such as with natural-linen, low quality cloth and wool, paper, and hardware. But generally German products were superior and of lower cost in the higher tiers, as Sked notes: “Austria produced for very rich people or for the very poor ones”.
We see a lower interest for steam powered engines in those decades; while many scholars put this down to “backwardness”, Good instead highlights that this could have been a rational response. Austria was one of the most important producers of charcoal in Europe, however it was not yet well connected to coal extraction areas and even its machinery was still technologically lagging behind the industrial powers of Europe. As a result the choice of importing the machines, the human capital to action and maintain them and even the coal to fuel them would have been proven more costly than increasing charcoal production. All this delayed the energetical shift until better and quicker infrastructure could secure lower prices. Another reason was given by the power detained by Bohemian and Hungarian landowners who saw iron production only as a means to sell more wood.
These infrastructures lagged initially; from1830 to 1850 railway construction was disappointing. Early construction produced only a limited increase in its railway system from 1845 to 1850 compared with those of France (+245%) and Germany (+180%), while Austria achieved only a meagre +85%. Even by explaining this as an interest limited only to strategic railways, with reduced scope, it still resulted in poor commercial use.
Aiming for economic self-sufficiency, for both commercial and political reasons, Austria followed an Autarkiepolitik. The new-born industries needed protection against external competition, and the government hoped that the low salaries of the eastern part of the empire could bring resources and supply to the western part. Another reason was the necessity to placate the feudal elements of Hungary and limit the influx of new ideals, like liberalism, into the empire. But this Autarkiepolitik made Austria less competitive and slowed its economic development. Meanwhile its financial system as it was trying to mimic that of France presented significant limitations, such as strong Viennese monopolies, there was for example no credit activities and no discounting activities outside Vienna.
This void was filled by the great banking houses, such as the Rothschilds, which financed industries, commercial activities and infrastructure. However, the Austrian credit system as a whole could hardly face the increased demand during the 1840s.
Table 1: Austria’s public finance data: 1834
|1834||Millions of gulden|
|Imperial family’s expenses||3.5|
Such a deficit brought forth the necessity for a new loan of 40,000,000 gulden in 1835, which was granted by the banks, but on the condition that the crown reduce its military expenses. Even without great military campaigns in 1847 we don’t see a radical improvement in the situation:
Table 2: Austria’s public finance data: 1847
|1847||Millions of gulden|
|Imperial family’s expenses||(included in the civil administration)|
This already unideal situation worsens in 1848, as we see a sharp increase in military expenses of 73 million, and a peak one year later with the enormous figure of 165 million. The deficit of those years was consequently 45 and 122 million respectively.
This led to a grave financial crisis. Kolowrat, the Minister of the Treasury, declared that the loan taken from the Rothschilds was the “last anchor of safety” and that thereafter there would be no resources left to face other problems. This confession was already late because even before the government was spending the last resources, the continuous crop failures since 1845 were already difficult to face.
Industrialization effort in the secon half of the century: compared results
The empire, now as a whole, endured a complex process of economic transformation. Even if not always successful this process reduced the gap created in the first period of the century. From 1867 to 1880 new industries emerged, the Austrian banking system was modernized, and Viennese monopolies were reduced. Boosted by this new availability of credit in the Western part of the empire, new extraction industries grew, such as the anthracite mines of Bohemia, strictly connected with the Wikowitz ironworks, operated by the Rothschilds, accounted for more than the 50% of the puddling ovens in Bohemia in 1870. Also, lignite output was growing; Bohemian lands were second in Europe behind Germany but ahead of France. Meanwhile in the Alpine lands many industries were relocating to Bohemia, and as a result the sugar, chemical and textile industries became greater in Bohemian lands than in the Alpine region.
Meanwhile in Hungary the credit system was not as developed and this lead to the intervention of the State as a substitutive element, as theorised by Gerschenkron, leading to a vigorous process of industrialization. This began with investment in the textile industry, then again in the heavy industries and in the foodstuff industry, particularly in flour production. Hungary still held a key role in agriculture, leading the empire’s exports.
As happened in many other countries, getting involved in a wider context was pushed ahead by railroad construction. The empire’s network expanded greatly, surpassing 40,000 km by 1913. This infrastructure was required in overcoming the geographical barriers present in the empire. The firsts links promoted by the Rothshild and Sina banking families connected Vienna to the industrial centres of the west. Then construction started eastward; in 1853 there were 1392 km in Austria and 414 in Hungary . This expansion continued in the following decades, principally in the private sector, until the depression of 1873 led the state to again take a leading role. Meanwhile the network not only reached the Carpathian hinterland but also the most remote regions of Hungary. In 1910 we can see how the railway density of even the less developed and more remote Hungarian regions, Transylvania and Croatia-Slavonia, had nearly doubled (with 96 and 82 km/100,000 inhabitants respectively), far higher than neighbouring states Romania, Bulgaria, Serbia and even Italy (with 49, 43, 31 and 53).
Table 3: Extension of the railway net, in km
|Year||Great Britain||France||Belgium||Germany||Habsburg Empire||Italy||Spain||Russia||U.S.A.|
This impressive network created a truly unified market, benefiting both the Austrian and the Hungarian economy. Austria was a safe market for Hungarian agricultural products and new-born industries and vice versa, Hungary was a safe market for more costly Alpine-Bohemian products. The significance of this internal market, with its population of 50,000,000, should not be underestimated. The effects of this network were not only internal, as it eased the economic pressure on Austrian imports and permitted Hungarian exports to reach new markets and obtain better prices. It also created a new influx of capital from west to east, gradually decreasing the economic disparities between the two halves.
The empire was regarded as a backwards economy on the eve of the First World War and in some ways it was, however it had made substantial leaps forward during the four decades prior to the war. This perceived backwardness is heavily influenced by the low level of steam power that had been deployed in the empire. Nevertheless, its railway network was still impressive, and held a significant and growing role in many sectors in Europe. It was also the third country in Europe by coal production.
Table 4, Capacity of all steam engines (in thousands of horse power)
Even comparing its performance with other latecomers, we see really positive results, as shown by the growth of GDP per capita as calculated by Kausel. From 1870 to 1913, the Dual Monarchy was just behind Sweden, Denmark and Germany. Another data study by Good compares internal disparities in the United States of America and the Austro-Hungarian Empire and shows that both states presented regional differences, between an industrialised north and an agrarian south in the former, and between an industrialised west and an agrarian east in the latter, in both cases due to latifundial properties. Regarding the U.S., Good notes how from 1840 to 1860 the income per capita of the South was roughly 75% of the national mean value. This gap widened terribly after the American Civil War, becoming just 50% in the 1880s and then stagnating for the remaining part of the century. Those differences narrowed only slightly over the following two decades only to increase again in the 1920s. Only in the 1950s did the southern states regain the levels of disparity reached before the Civil War.
In the Austro-Hungarian Empire on the other hand, disparity between east and west increased in the mid nineteenth century at double the rate of the United States, however from the 1860s, where disparity exploded in the U.S., in the empire it stabilised and then steadily decreased at varying speeds: more quickly in the 1880s, more slowly in the 1900s. These results show a greater economic unity and more reliable progress towards economic unification in the Austro-Hungarian Empire than the United States, largely defined as a paragon of economic success.
Table 5: Comparative growth rates: real GNP per capita in 1960 U.S. dollars (in percent)
Fejtő shares the same perspective:
Ainsi la monarchie participa-t-elle au miracle économique européen de la fin du siècle. Entre 1830 et 1870, le produit national brut per capita s’accrut de 0,5 p. 100 par an, plaçant la monarchie au même niveau que la Suède et la Russie, quand bien même elle restait en retard sur la France, la Belgique, l’Allemagne et la Grande-Bretagne. Mais, dans les années 1900 à 1913, la croissance était d’1,14. L’Autriche-Hongrie avait donc atteint le niveau de l’Allemagne, de la Suède et du Danemark. Dans les régions occidentales, la croissance était de 1,46 p. 100.
Table 6 : Relative share of world manufacturing 1750-1900 (%)
In conclusion, the supposed economic “backwardness” of the Austro-Hungarian Empire should be re-evaluated, since it is a relative parameter and comparisons with contemporary European powers are often positive, and particularly so in the four decades prior to the First World War. Rather than its economic performance, it was instead the institutional structures that were backward, remaining largely unchanged since 1867. Too often economic analyses are influenced by political outcomes. Fejtö insists that it was not the archaic institutions that slowed the economic development of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, rather it was the economic success and rapid industrial development that undermined the bond between the composing nations in such an archaic institutional superstructure as it was the empire.
Bolovan I.,Holom E.C., Eppel M., Ethnicity and Politics: Censuses in the Austro-Hungarian Empire (Case Study: Transylvania, 1869-1910), in Romanian Journal of Population Studies, Cluj-Napoca, vol 10, n.2, 2016, pp. 137-151.
Claphman J.H., Economic Development of France & Germany 1815-1914, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1968.
Fejtő F., Requiem pour un empire défunt. Histoire de la destruction de l’Autriche-Hongrie, Édima, Paris, 1993
Gerschenkron A., Il problema storico dell’arretratezza economica, Einaudi, Milano, 1974.
Good D. F., The economic rise of the Habsburg Empire 1750-1914, University of California Press, London, 1984
Gross N., The Industrial Revolution in the Habsburg Monarchy, in The Fontana Economic History of Europe, vol. 4, part 1, Collins/Fontana, Glasgow, 1973.
Gross N., Austria-hungary in the World Economy, in Komlos (ed.) The Habsburg Monarchy as a Custom Union, Economic Development in the Habsburg Monarchy in the Nineteenth century, Guildford, 1983, pp.1-45.
Jones E., The European Miracle Environments, Economies and Geopolitics in the History of Europe and Asia, Cambridge University Press, 1981.
Komlos (ed.) The Habsburg Monarchy as a Custom Union, Economic Development in the Habsburg Monarchy in the Nineteenth century, Guildford, 1983.
Maggi S., Le ferrovie, Bologna, il Mulino, 2003.
Rudolph R., Economic revolution in Austria? The meaning of 1848 in Austrian economic History, in John Komlos (ed.) The Habsburg Monarchy as a Custom Union, Economic Development in the Habsburg Monarchy in the Nineteenth century, Guildford, 1983.
Toninelli P.A. (ed.), Lo Sviluppo economico moderno, Marsilio, Venezia, 2015
Vries P., Escaping Poverty, the origins of modern economic growth, Vienna University Press, Vienna, 2013.
Cover image: Leopoldaure werke, 1900, credit to Siemens AG.
 Vries P., Escaping Poverty, the origins of modern economic growth, Vienna University Press, Vienna, 2013, pp. 2223.
 Gross N., The industrial Revolution in the Habsburg Monarchy, in The Fontana Economic History of Europe, vol. 4, part 1, Collins/Fontana, Glasgow, 1973, pp. 229-238
 Good D. F., The economic rise of the Habsburg Empire 1750-1914, University of California Press, London, 1984, pp. 38 – 48.
 Ivi, p. 40.
 Ivi, p. 45
 Rudolph R., Economic revolution in Austria? The meaning of 1848 in Austrian economic History, in John Komlos
(ed.) The Habsburg Monarchy as a Custom Union, Economic Development in the Habsburg Monarchy in the Nineteenth century, Guildford, 1983, p. 42
 Jones E., The European Miracle Environments, Economies and Geopolitics in the History of Europe and Asia, Cambridge University Press, 1981, pp. 45-46
 Good D. F., The economic rise of the Habsburg Empire 1750-1914, University of California Press, London, 1984, p.11
 Ivi, p. 14-21.
 Bolovan I.,Holom E.C., Eppel M., Ethnicity and Politics: Censuses in the Austro-Hungarian Empire (Case Study: Transylvania, 1869-1910), in Romanian Journal of Population Studies, Cluj-Napoca, vol 10, n.2, 2016, pp. 137-151.
 Good D.F., The Economic Rise of the Habsburg Empire p. 32.
 Ivi, pp. 20-24.
 Claphman J.H., Economic Development of France & Germany 1815-1914, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1968, p. 25, p.65.
 Good D.F., The Economic Rise of the Habsburg Empire p. 50.
 Paulinyi A., Der technische Fortschritt im Eisenhuttenwesen der Alpenlander und seine betriebswirtschaftlichen Auswirkungen (1600-1860), 1974, pp. 156-157, [cited by] Good D., The economic rise of the Habsburg Empire, p. 53. 15 Ivi p. 57.
 Sked A., Grandezza e caduta dell’impero Asburgico, pp. 68-71. 17 Sked A., Grandezza e caduta dell’impero asburgico, p. 68
 Cit. Ivi, p.68.
 Good D.F., The Economic Rise of the Habsburg Empire, pp. 63-64.
 Sked A., Grandezza e caduta dell’impero asburgico, p. 62.
 Sked A., Grandezza e caduta dell’impero asburgico, p. 69.
 Turnbull P.E.., Austria vol 2, pp. 21-22, 340, 344 [cited by] Sked A., Grandezza e caduta dell’impero asburgico, p.71.
 Enderes R., Revolution in Osterreich, Wien, 1947, p. 38 [cited by] Sked A., Grandezza e caduta dell’Impero Asburgico, p.71.
 Sked A., Grandezza e Caduta dell’impero Asburgico, pp. 70-72.
 Good D. F., The economic rise of the Habsburg Empire, pp. 131-133.
 Gerschenkron A., Il problema storico dell’arretratezza economica, Einaudi, Milano, 1974, p. 21.
 Sked A., Grandezza e caduta dell’impero asburgico, p. 201.
 Good D.F., The economic rise of the Habsburg Empire, pp. 99-100.
 Italian data is for 1913, not 1910.
 Vries P., Escaping Poverty, p. 21. ; Maggi S., Le ferrovie, il Mulino 2003.
 Tables 5 and 6.
 Toninelli P.A. (ed.), Lo Sviluppo economico moderno, Marsilio, Venezia, 2015, p. 605.
 Vries P., Escaping Poverty, pp. 20-21.
 Kausel, Osterreichs Volkseinkommen, (cited by) Good D., Economic Rise of the Habsburg Empire, p. 242.
 Good D.F., The Economic Rise of the Habsburg Empire, pp.246-250.
 Ivi, pp. 108-123.
 Ivi, p. 239
 Fejtő F., Requiem pour un empire défunt. Histoire de la destruction de l’Autriche-Hongrie, Édima, Paris, 1993 p. 161.
 Vries P., Escaping Poverty, p. 20.
 Gerschenkron A., Il problema storico dell’arretratezza economica, pp. 6-12.
 Fejtö F., Requiem pour un empire défunt, pp. 160-172